Piety, MacIntyre, and Kierkegaardian Choice: A Reply to Professor Ballard by Davenport, John
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 15 Issue 3 Article 6 
7-1-1998 
Piety, MacIntyre, and Kierkegaardian Choice: A Reply to Professor 
Ballard 
John Davenport 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Davenport, John (1998) "Piety, MacIntyre, and Kierkegaardian Choice: A Reply to Professor Ballard," Faith 
and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 15 : Iss. 3 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol15/iss3/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
PIETY, MACINTYRE, AND KIERKEGAARDIAN 
CHOICE: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR BALLARD 
John Davenport 
This paper concerns a debate between two previous articles in Faith and 
Philosophy. In 1995, Bruce Ballard criticized Marilyn Piety's argument that the 
Kierkegaardian "choice" between the 'aesthetic' and 'ethical' modes of exis-
tence is not an irrational or criterionless leap. Instead, Ballard defended 
MacIntyre's view that Kierkegaard's position succumbs to the tensions inherit-
ed from its opposing enlightenment sources. I argue in response that Ballard 
sets up a false dilemma for Kierkegaard and misunderstands Kierkegaardian 
pathos. To bolster Piety's position, I compare her analysis to my own argu-
ment (developed in an earlier paper) that the "choice" to determine oneself in 
light of ethical distinctions has to do with the personal appropriation, not the 
authority, of morality. I also compare this to arguments from several other 
scholars that the choice in Either/Or has to do with taking responsibility for and 
developing one's 'self,' not with providing a foundation for moral norms. 
Finally, in light of these analyses, I argue against Ballard's remaining socialist 
criticism that Kierkegaard's ethics is "bourgeois." 
1. Introduction 
In her 1993 paper, "Kierkegaard on Rationality," Marilyn G. Piety 
argues that in After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre misinterpreted 
Kierkegaard when he said that for Kierkegaard, "the transition from an 
aesthetic to an ethical view of existence" can only be made by an arbi-
trary or "criterionless choice."l Piety's view is hardly uncommon: for 
several years now, Kierkegaard scholars have almost unanimously 
rejected MacIntyre's irrationalist reading of Kierkegaard as a grave mis-
interpretation.2 But apparently many in the wider philosophical com-
munity still remain unconvinced. In his recent response to Piety in this 
journaV Bruce W. Ballard argues that Kierkegaard's Either-Or exhibits 
conflicting tendencies towards overcoming the aesthetic stage either by 
a Hegelian "objective refutation" or by the alleged decisionism of a "pas-
sionate choice."4 In response, I will compare Piety's analysis to my own 
previously published argument against MacIntyre's contention, which 
Ballard repeats, that "Kierkegaard's ethical stage has no authority but 
the passion of the individual choosing it."s Once the fallacy in this con-
tention is understood, it will be easy to dispatch the remaining errors in 
Ballard's argument against Piety. 
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Tl. Ballard's Dilemma for Piety 
Against MacIntyre, Piety maintains that in the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, Kierkegaard portrays despair brought about by persistent or 
deep misfortune as facilitating the transition from the "aesthetic" to the 
"ethical" stage of human life: since the ethical framework explains suf-
fering tragically, i.e. as "essential" to temporal existence, the aesthete 
who despairs of living in immediacy discovers that the ethical frame-
work may have first-personal significance for his own experience.6 But 
Ballard, following MacIntyre's Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, objects 
that there is a "blank inconsistency" in Kierkegaard's desire both to give 
an "objective refutation" of the aesthetic sphere by showing that it "fails 
by its own criteria" and yet to leave the decision to "passionate choice,"? 
which Ballard identifies with the affects of romanticism: "Hegelian 
dialectic and the romanticism of feeling do not combine for a coherent 
theory of choice.'" 
There are several problems with this alleged dilemma, both as a dis-
missal of Kierkegaard's endeavor and as a response to Piety's interpreta-
tion. First, Ballard interprets Kierkegaard's emphasis on the problem of 
suffering and exposure to the whims of fortune as a Hegelian dialectical 
move: "Kierkegaard is clearly trying to exhibit contradiction internal to 
the aesthetic point of view ... "" But, while Kierkegaard's progress from 
immediacy to the ethical and on to the religious does parallel part of 
Hegel's dialectic,lO the suffering towards which Piety points is not a sim-
ple contradiction in aesthetic life that would compel one into the ethical 
sphere. The necessity with which Hegel endows his transitions of spirit 
is missing in the passage between Kierkegaard's existential stages, since 
they allow for freedom. Moreover, as we will see, the despair through 
which the aesthete begins to take account of the ethical is not the com-
pleted choice to leave aesthetic existence, but only the practical condi-
tion of possibility for this choice. As Alastair Hannay says in his 
remarks on Either/Or, the point of setting up a pseudonymous "con-
frontation of the two views of life" is precisely to provoke "something 
like a direct or intuited realization of the preferability of the ethical from 
a direct comparison of the two views," without appeal to external 
authority.11 But the choice is not criterion less, as Hannay says, because it 
is to be made by people starting within the aesthetic. Kierkegaard's aim is 
to raise the levels of consciousness of such people sufficiently for 
them to see the point of actually calling their preferences aesthetic, 
and thereby enable them to see that there could be an alternativeY 
And once the alternative is made explicit or self-conscious, a number of 
considerations will reveal the rightness of the ethical, though again 
without forcing its election.13 In particular, buttressing Piety's point, 
Hannay notes that the aesthete's attempt to live in "the succession of 
moments" generates a sense of dependence on fate outside his control 
that "leads easily to despair."14 This critique of the aesthetic is more sim-
ilar to Socrates's argument in the Republic that the tyrant's soul cannot 
354 Faith and Philosophy 
achieve happiness than to an inexorable Hegelian Aufhebung. 
Having misinterpreted this aspect of Kierkegaard's position as an 
attempted demonstration that the ethical must supersede the aesthetic 
with Hegelian necessity, Ballard completes his false dilemma by misread-
ing the other horn -"passionate choice" - as mere sublime "feeling." In 
this, he ignores Piety's argument that for Kierkegaard, "passion" or 
pathos is neither mere emotion nor disinterested reflection, since it 
involves a rationality that is "not reducible ... to reflection" in the specula-
tive sense. l ' Rather, there is a kind of "rational assessment of phenome-
na" which is interested because it involves "subjective engagement" or 
has the self as jts object, but is nevertheless not capricious like a mere 
affective reaction. 16 I would describe the same point by saying that 
Kierkegaard preserves a place for volition in its classical 'middle-soul' 
sense: like emotion and unlike abstract speculation, the practical delibera-
tion Piety describes is first-personally motivating, but unlike impulses 
and brute preferences, it has intentional content, cognitive significance, 
and is reasons-responsive. The motivation generated in such practical 
deliberation is "subjective" in the first-personal but not the non-cognitive 
sense. In particular, Piety believes that such 'volitional passion,' as we 
might call it, is connected with our essential interest in "determining or 
choosing the proper interpretation of existence;" hence, in "impassioned 
or subjective judgment" the aesthete can be motivated to enter the ethical 
framework by the improbability of persistent suffering on the aesthetic 
account of life.l? 
Against this central point, the only objection Ballard offers is that "the 
proper degree of passion cannot be specified."l' Here again, however, 
the idea that the will is either guided by a purely "theoretical grasp of my 
ultimate end" or else it is not "rationally guided" at all and anything 
goes,'Y presents the same false dilemma in another guise. As Gordon 
Marino put it in another valuable analysis of MacIntyre's critique, saying 
that "we always have a choice" is not to say that "we always have a coin 
to toss." In Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre himself acknowl-
edges that there is "something between chance and demonstration."2I) 
And as Anthony Rudd has explained in a recent study, Kierkegaard 
gives good reasons in his analysis of skepticism for concluding that the 
will "to commit oneself to what is dubitable" is already involved in all 
"substantive knowledge,"21 and this includes knowledge of ethical pre-
cepts. Contrary to MacIntyre's portrait of Kierkegaard as an enlighten-
ment thinker who accepts the need to demonstrate the authority of moral 
contrasts and principles without presupposition, Kierkegaard never held 
that morality can be justified to the amoralist from a neutral, "disen-
gaged" stance: rather, the interestedness of the will affects how we inter-
pret the conditions of human fulfillment, which in turn prescribe in what 
ways we should be interested. This circle is not vicious, but it cannot be 
escaped through some Archimedean skeptic-defeating insight into the 
ethical. As Rudd says against MacIntyre, however, the Judge is "con-
stantly arguing" for the ethical, not simply "giving portraits of the ethical 
life," and his arguments are powerful just "because they are concerned 
with what' A' - or anyone else - is interested in attaining: happiness, 
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well-being, eudaimonia."22 Similarly, Marino argues that "Kierkegaard's 
concept of choice presupposes a universal but not universally recognized 
need to be whole."n Or as Piety puts it, "Kierkegaard maintains that we 
have an essential interest in determining or choosing the proper interpre-
tation of existence"2' which makes self-unity possible. In short, the 
Judge's arguments appeal to the situated, existing will that conditions the 
aesthete's interpretation of fulfillment, though without determining it to 
choose the ethical-and this is just what Piety found in her analysis of the 
Postscript as well. 
III. A Comparison of My Defense of Kierkegaard to Piety's 
In my 1995 paper on "The Meaning of Kierkegaard's Choice Between 
the Aesthetic and the Ethical," independently of Piety,2" I gave different 
arguments for the same conclusion that MacIntyre is wrong in constru-
ing Kierkegaard as an irrationalist and in analyzing the "primordial 
choice" to be an agent who chooses in ethical consciousness as free only 
in an arbitrary sense. Drawing on Harry Frankfurt's argument that the 
most distinctive feature of persons is their capacity to form what he calls 
higher-order volitions by which persons "identify" with some of their 
possible motives for acting while alienating others (whereas agents who 
act on desires without such higher-order volitions are "wanton"), I 
argued that the "primordial choice" which Judge William describes in 
Either/Or Vol. II can be interpreted as the choice between remaining 
"wanton" or taking responsibility for one's "self" through higher-order 
volitions.'" Therefore the primordial choice to become a chooser-in-the-
ethical-sense (chooser,) does not generate the authority of ethical princi-
ples for the individual, as MacIntyre assumes, but rather gives the dis-
tinction between good and evil personal relevance and application with-
in the individual's life -for only "inner character" or dispositions of the 
higher-order will can have moral virtue, rectitude, or their opposites.27 
Thus when a person makes choices in the higher-order will, identifying 
with some possible action-guiding intentions rather than others in light 
of their varying values, she is choosing "in the ethical sense" for 
Kierkegaard, and her volitional identifications will have moral worth or 
unworth. But the objective authority of her conscience -the cognitive 
aspect of her values and standards of moral worth- does not derive 
from her original choice to form her self through higher-order volitions. 
Thus I compared the position of a conscious or awakened aesthete, who 
finally faces this choice, to that of someone who knows the traffic laws 
but has not yet driven: her decision to get behind the wheel involves her 
personally in this practice for the first time, and will lead to her acquiring 
a "driving character" (e.g. reckless, overcautious, defensive, etc .. ) but it 
hardly creates the authority she recognizes in the traffic code or the 
virtues of a good driver.28 Similarly, the Judge's point in Either/Or II is 
that the aesthete should engage in the practice of selfhood -or higher-
order volition- through which she will acknowledge her self and 
acquire status on the scale of moral worth. 
If this reading is right, it constitutes a decisive refutation of the claim 
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that "Kierkegaard's ethical stage has no authority but the passion of the 
individual choosing it."29 This analysis fills out Marino's point that, in 
Either/Or, "Kierkegaard thought he was writing about choice in funda-
mental connection with the formation of the self and the purification of 
the will," rather than "aspiring to produce a basis for morals" in the 
wake of Kant's failure. In the face of this fact, MacIntyre's account 
appears to be either a willful misconstrual or a wholly unjustified sug-
gestion that Kierkegaard had unconscious, ulterior motives.)(l 
Similarly, the close relation between Kierkegaardian passion and voli-
tional identification shows what is wrong in Ballard's view that it is 
incoherent to make "the choice for the ethical a purely subjective and 
passionate one while the concept of ethics is abstract and universal."31 
For the primordial choice to be a chooserc , or "to live seriously as 
opposed to indifferently,"J2 as Marino puts it, is made by identifying 
with some set of values or "ground projects" (whether good or evil) that 
give first-personal significance to norms and precepts: their universal 
form therefore does not imply that they need be "impersonal" or exter-
nal to the agent's motivating concerns.33 The force of these arguments 
against incautious charges of irrationalism will be all the greater if my 
analysis and Piety's are mutually reinforcing, as I believe they are. 
Although we adopt apparently quite different strategies in defending 
Kierkegaard from such charges, there is an underlying convergence 
between our interpretations, which I will outline in five items. 
First, higher-order volitions are rational passions in Piety's sense: "the 
'earnestness' and 'pathos' characteristic of good or evil choice do not sig-
nify mere intensity of emotion ... but rather that the choice unequivocally 
associates the inward self with the content chosen."34 Similarly, although 
he initially analyzed a "second-order volition" simply as a desire that is 
about another desire -a desire to be guided or moved in one's bodily 
actions by one first-order desire (A) rather than another (B)"- Frankfurt 
later modified this analysis in recognition that to identify with desire A 
rather than B must involve more than merely having another desire to act 
on A.3b The higher-order volition is not merely a further desire or brute 
preference, but rather an attitude that essentially includes a non-arbi-
trary evaluation, which itself involves "deciding what to think."37 
Identification is a process of personally engaging the whole self through a 
kind of reasoning, namely an "interested" or non-detached practical rea-
soning: in other words, higher-order volition is "will" in the classical 
middle-soul sense, constituting a type of motivation between engaged 
appetite and disengaged intellect. Unlike the wanton, the person who 
engages in volitional identification is "participating in conflicts within 
himself between second-order volitions and first-order desires ... "3b This 
notion clarifies what Piety is trying to indicate with the Polanyian idea 
that "passion" signifies a direct "personal participation" of the agent, as 
opposed to "disinterested" reflection on our options. 39 Since this capaci-
ty for higher-order volition is arguably identical to the "spirit" in which 
alone we develop our "self" for Kierkegaard/o it also becomes clearer 
why "passion is the very essence of human existence," as Piety says.41 
This is true precisely because "passion" for Kierkegaard is first-personal 
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identification in something like Frankfurt's sense; it is the volitional 
capacity which makes us persons. 
Second, after distinguishing the "primordial choice" to engage in 
volitional identification from the recognition of ethical distinctions as 
authoritative, I argued that when the aesthete in Either/Or J[ faces the 
choice between the aesthetic and the ethical explicitly, she is conscious 
of a primordial responsibility to choose the ethicalY Her choice is thus 
not reasonless or unmotivated, and as a result she can no longer remain 
in the neutral immediacy of the aesthetic: if she tries to return to it, she 
instead enters sinful defiance (denying the ethical responsibility of which 
she is nevertheless aware).43 Marino concurs: "if you are really facing 
the choice, you have already chosen to choose;" you can refuse the ethi-
cal in defiance, but cannot return to the aesthetic, since the aesthetic is 
the stage in which "earnest choice" that recognizes one's selfhood (or 
capacity for volitional identification) is lacking.44 Therefore the aesthete 
can remain in her stage of existence only by a kind of tacit refusal to face 
the choice implied by her sel£hood, a state of "bad faith."4s This substan-
tially agrees with Piety's point that for Kierkegaard, 
even the least reflective individual can only avoid recognizing the 
tenuous nature of happiness on the aesthetic view of existence by 
willfully refusing to reflect upon the significance of this view.46 
Third, I also argue that the process by which the primordial choice 
between the aesthetic and ethical spheres of existence becomes salient 
for the agent -or is "forced" in James's sense- is a complex one in 
which both the individual's experience and willingness to face the insuf-
ficiency of the aesthetic playa roleY Piety's argument that suffering or 
misfortune may force the issue on Kierkegaard's view explains part of 
this process by which an individual is elicited out of immediacy and 
brought to face the question of how to determine her third or highest-
order will, i.e. the will either to form second-order volitions and thus to 
acquire an inner character (whether good or evil), or to resist forming 
such volitions and (vainly) try to live in the immediate ebb and flow of 
first-order desires and preferences.4R 
Fourth, Piety's thesis that the passion of suffering gives significance to 
"extra-framework criteria or reasons for choosing" between the aesthetic 
and ethical frameworks helps fill in a gap left by my earlier analysis. 
While I asserted that the person facing the primordial choice does not 
choose arbitrarily because he already discovers a primordial responsibil-
ity to choose ethical choice (or to form a higher-order volitional charac-
ter), I did not try to explain the phenomenal source of its objective 
authority. Piety's view that Kierkegaard's individual has an inherent 
desire for an interpretive scheme that makes sense of her subjective 
experience and explains the basis on which her happiness depends/9 
which she compares to Taylor's "need for meaning,"50 suggests an 
intriguing way of answering this question. This is not to deny Marino's 
concession that Kierkegaard does not fully face the questions raised by 
"moral diversity" or differences of ideals, nor does he emphasize rea-
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son's role in deriving or grounding specific moral precepts.51 But it goes 
too far to claim that duty has no rational basis, or that "for Kierkegaard, 
the force of our oughts in no way rests upon the answers to our whys."52 
For as I have suggested, Kierkegaard's focus on the "internal" as 
opposed to the "external" should be read as asserting the decisive 
importance of the higher-order will in determining our moral worth: 
this does not imply that our outward acts and their consequences are 
irrelevant, nor that there is no role for casuistry. 53 
Fifth and finally, like Piety, I argued in my article that the freedom 
involved in passionate choice for Kierkegaard is a kind of "liberty" -
since the outcome is not determined by its antecedents and alternate 
possible outcomes are accessible to the agent- but not an indifferent liber-
ty in which the individual neutrally or randomly picks between options. 
Instead, Kierkegaard holds that the range of available choices and the 
apparent value of different options to the individual is always condi-
tioned by the character she already is, i.e., by both her outward habits of 
bodily action and her inward dispositions of the higher-order will. Since 
actualized choices shape these features of character which condition the 
availability and salience of options in future choices, no choice in this 
existential model is ever just "arbitrarily reversible."" And because the 
person naturally begins with an aesthetic character, including a tacit 
highest-order will (in bad faith) not to make choices informed by ethical 
distinctions, even the primordial choice of the highest-order will is not 
indifferent.55 Piety concurs, noting that arbitrary choice is impossible on 
Kierkegaard's account, because 
Kierkegaard believes that we inherit an aesthetic interpretation of 
existence simply by being human and that we will never adopt any 
other perspective without a specific reason for doing so; and such a 
reason cannot arise, on his view, unless we take an interested 
stance toward the phenomena of our subjective experience.56 
Hence "For Kierkegaard, there is no sitting on the fence between selves," 
as Marino says.57 
In sum, my account and Piety's converge on five basic points about 
ethical authority, free choice, and the structure of personhood -in 
Either/Or and the Postscript, respectively. Together our analyses provide 
a deeper defense of a view summarized by Timothy Jackson, which may 
represent an emerging consensus among Kierkegaard scholars today: 
Ethical and religious questions call for passionate choice, but the 
choice is not arbitrary. Kierkegaard is a realist with regard to 
ethico-religious truth and a fallibilist with regard to ethico-religious 
justification; his introduction of volition and emotion into the equa-
tion ... does not spell the loss of objective norms for right behavior." 
Thus it is particularly imperative that we not make MacIntyre's error 
of ascribing the value-relativism and absolute liberty of Sartre's Being 
and Nothingness to Kierkegaard: as Jackson says, there is "the widest pos-
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sible intellectual distance between Kierkegaard's conception of subjec-
tivity and the arbitrary individualism of Nietzsche and Sartre."S9 
The natural next step in the approach Piety and I have taken is to 
argue against the still widely held view that Kierkegaard is a theological 
voluntarist in the sense of holding that "God is not bound by even the 
highest moral rule" and therefore that the knight of faith "may be called 
upon to violate generally valid moral rules."no Against this familiar 
reading, I have argued that the sense in which Abraham "suspends the 
ethical" in Fear and Trembling has nothing to do with adding to humanly 
communicable ethical standards a new "requirement of obedience to 
God's particular commands."bl Rather, on my reading, the famous "tele-
ological suspension" refers to the expectation ("absurd" by every human 
standard of possibility) of an eschatologically possible reprieve in the realm 
of temporal finitude, a miraculous turn which fulfills the ethical and 
even restores the individual to ethical validity.62 The personal relation to 
eschatological divinity which such faith involves certainly transcends 
communicable ethical relations, but it incorporates and goes beyond them 
by realizing the eternal ethical ideal in the actuality of time, rather than 
violating the ethical."3 If this reading can be extended to other pseudo-
nymous works concerned with religious categories, it will show that the 
"leap" from the ethical to religious spheres of existence is no more arbi-
trary or misologist than the choice by which the aesthete first relates her-
self to her selfhood and enters the ethical sphere. A4 So much for Ballard's 
MacIntyrian equation of Kierkegaard's divine Absolute with "the 
Blakean concept of God as Nobodaddy."65 This analysis also shows that 
Kierkegaardian faith is hardly a "revised form of Pascal's wager" as 
Ballard saysn": for the designation "absurd" means precisely that escha-
tological possibility is incalculable, not that faith is prudentially rational. 
IV. Ballard's Remaining Socialist Objections 
Against this background, the rest of Ballard's objections, which are 
made directly against Kierkegaard rather than towards Piety, can be 
dealt with in quick succession. First, Ballard argues, amazingly, that 
"Kierkegaard's paradigm of the ethical stage is the life of a self-satisfied 
bourgeois."6l For those who would have thought that this better 
described the aesthetic stage, Ballard's evidence for this claim is that 
"Kierkegaard's ethical is virtually apolitica1," individualistic, and lack-
ing in "any clear notion or concern for justice ... "6R Living on his own 
inheritance, he thinks money is irrelevant, and to the poor he offers only 
an unforgiving puritanical work ethic. Moreover, by ignoring the social 
structures in which work is embedded, "Kierkegaard ends up making a 
virtue of alienated labor."n'! 
In response to this quasi-Marxist critique, we must openly acknowl-
edge that Kierkegaard did not devote himself to casuistry, i.e., deriving 
rational precepts of natural justice (though he acknowledges that such 
principles exist), nor did he develop an account of justified political 
authority on their basis. This was not his task: Kierkegaard was not 
Aquinas, much less Rawls. But this difference in focus hardly suffices to 
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make his ethical outlook "bourgeois." His emphasis on many different 
forms of charity in Works of Love alone is sufficient to disarm this charge. 
As the Hangs write in their introduction to this book: 
... there is ... also a social otherness in the emphasis on love of 
neighbour. This is not an ethic of socia-political structures but an 
ethic of social-structures-at-hand, whatever the larger socia-politi-
cal structures might be. Those who say that Kierkegaard had no 
consciousness of anything but a purely private individualistic ethic 
cannot digest this work, nor, when properly understood, his other 
ethical works, but least of all this.70 
Kierkegaard does not, pace Ballard, conceive the ethical as a purely 
individual determination in isolation from social relations: as Anthony 
Rudd has emphasized, "For Kierkegaard, morality is a product of com-
mitment to roles and relationships."71 Rudd describes this feature of 
"engagement" which the aesthete avoids as "long-term commitment;"n I 
have analyzed it similarly in terms of volitional identification. But 
although such identification is a free decision of the individual, Rudd is 
right that it is precisely identification with a social self/3 i.e., with disposi-
tions, motives, and ends that constitute the "character" who we become 
in the social world -the character expressed in our actions and intelligi-
ble to others as the object of interpersonal interpretation. We identify 
with being a character that locates us in social space as an agent with 
commitments or cares based on shared understandings of what is 
important or worthy of being cared about. This point is implicitly con-
ceded in Ballard's own objection that "Kierkegaard would have us see 
every job as a calling," although Ballard misreads this as validating 
alienated labor.74 As Rudd notes, the Kierkegaardian agent living in the 
ethical mode "chooses to accept social roles" rather than merely occupy-
ing them: for example, through ethical participation in eternity, Judge 
William incorporates his social roles as citizen, judge, father, and hus-
band into the continuity of his life. 7s The point is not that workers 
should passively consent to exploitation, but that our work should 
express what we care about, that we should be able to engage ourselves 
in our jobs, or embed them in our "self" through identification. And 
interestingly, this is similar to what Marx meant in his critique of wage 
labor and his ideal of non-alienated labor.7" Since there are limitations on 
the kinds of work with which an ethical agent could identify, it is more 
plausible to read Kierkegaard's doctrine as diametrically opposed to the 
alienating labor processes of capitalism that divorce work from human 
identity and demand a purely instrumental conception of careers. 
Finally, Ballard does not offer convincing evidence that Kierkegaard's 
"paradoxical religious stage" is anti-congregational and ignores the 
problem of expressing Christian faith "in wider social and political cul-
ture."?7 The attack on "Christendom" is not a rejection of genuine 
Christian community, but a critique, as David Gouwens says, of a 
"Bourgeois Christianity" in which everyone is regarded as "Christian" 
by default, a culture that "succeeds in making spiritlessness and worldli-
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ness that mark of spirituality." Instead, Kierkegaard develops implica-
tions of an "inwardness" that leads to "an appreciation of how faith is 
manifest in works and hence also in the public sphere."7" Thus Ballard's 
summary of Kierkegaard's ethico-religious life as "hard work regardless 
of pay, a vaguely church-going religion and the domestic idyll"7Y is both 
inaccurate and unfair. 
In closing, let me acknowledge that the general picture which Ballard 
offers of Kierkegaard's ethical ideal -namely, solipsistic pietism 
reached by an arbitrary leap- is a picture that has been widely dissemi-
nated and often repeated. But Kierkegaard scholars have been refuting 
it for several decades now, and thus many of the points I make in 
response to Ballard are not new. It is unfortunate that this false picture 
of Kierkegaard's position continues to exert a strong influence, since its 
time as a defensible interpretation is clearly past, and it can now safely 
be consigned to the annals of famous misunderstandings.sll 
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